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Rolling cross-section surveys (RCS) have become increasingly popular in recent years 
and have been implemented in many countries – also in Switzerland in the run-up to 
the 2011 elections.1 In an RCS, a given number of interviews are conducted every day 
during the entire campaign period. New addresses are added every day and the 
treatment of the addresses and the field work are designed in a way that interviews 
conducted every day constitute a random sample. The design offers many advantages 
for studying the influence of election campaigns on citizens’ voting behaviour, but it 
also provides some methodological challenges. While the theoretical concepts for 
using such a design are well known, little has been published on the actual fieldwork of 
RCS studies so far. This working paper helps to fill this gap by describing in detail the 
design, the fieldwork, and the methodological and practical challenges encountered 
during the implementation of the 2011 Swiss RCS study. We show that although there 
was no previous experience with the design in Switzerland, and despite some 
inevitable difficulties with the fieldwork, it was possible to gather high quality data. 
However, different challenges remain. Our experience shows some of the pitfalls to 
avoid and questions to be tackled when implementing such as survey. Since such 
information has been until now almost non-existent, we believe this might be a valuable 
contribution to the literature. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
 
 
1 Detailed information on the Swiss Electoral Studies, the first results of the Selects 2011 project, as well as the 
RCS data and the associated media content analysis can be found on the project website: www.selects.ch. 
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1. Introduction 
While electoral research has proved to be successful in explaining stability in citizens’ 
voting behaviour, e.g. with regard to the impact of party identifications or cleavages, it 
has revealed more difficulties with the explanation of change – especially short-term 
changes. However, such changes do occur, and they can potentially be decisive. As 
the first analysis of Switzerland’s 2011 National Council elections suggests, almost 40 
percent of voters casted their ballot for a party different from the one they had reported 
they intended to vote for during the last weeks of the campaign (Lutz 2012: 55). To 
explain such last-minute vote shifts, one must therefore analyse how campaigns 
influence the way in which citizens evaluate parties, form their vote intentions, and take 
their vote decisions. And since campaigns are highly dynamic phenomena, as Bartels 
(2006: 134) states, “good campaign studies must be dynamic too. [Therefore…] time 
must enter the analysis either directly or indirectly (as a proxy for campaign activities or 
events).” 
An increasingly popular possibility to study such short-term effects is the 
implementation of RCS surveys. The basic idea of this innovative design is to “spread a 
conventional cross-section […] over a certain period of time, distributing the interviews 
in a strictly controlled way. Properly done, the date on which a respondent is 
interviewed is therefore as much a product of random selection as the initial inclusion 
of that respondent into the sample” (Johnston and Brady 2002: 283). The data 
collected in an RCS allow a fine-grained analysis of dynamic phenomena of public 
opinion, e.g. of aggregate shifts in the electorate’s attitudes or opinions. In particular 
the possibility of comparisons from day to day offers researchers a much more flexible 
way to capture campaign dynamics and allows the detection of short-term shifts in 
public opinion. Other methods, such as repeated cross-sections or panel designs, 
typically cannot offer such flexibility since the time intervals between their successive 
waves are usually much larger.5 This is the main reason why the RCS design has been 
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widely used in different election studies around the globe6 and some national election 
studies, for example the German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES), have included an 
RCS survey as a standard component of their study since 2005. 
1.1. The basic RCS design 
Parties and candidates spend a lot of time, effort, and money to convince the voters to 
vote for them. However, what we usually study is not so much how campaigns affect 
the way in which citizens evaluate candidates and parties, but rather what comes out at 
the end of this process: the effective vote choice. Research on electoral behaviour 
usually relies on post-election surveys conducted in the days and weeks after an 
election and those studies do not allow to analyse the actual process of opinion 
formation very well. 
As Thomas Holbrook (1996: 46) rightly noted, it is “difficult [to understand…] the effect 
of any process […] if the focus is only on what comes out at the end of the process.” 
With a view to the supposed effects of election campaigns he therefore took a stand for 
expanding the respective analyses to “include studying the dynamics of public opinion 
during the campaign period.” Following this argument, Schmitt-Beck and his colleagues 
(2006: 16) even declared it to be the main task of campaign research to unhide 
changes in the opinions and attitudes of the electorate – and to explain them with the 
events of the campaign. Election campaigns can thereby be understood as a series of 
information-rich events (Hillygus and Jackman 2003: 584), which might include the 
participation of candidates in various events as well as the parties’ advertisements and 
– maybe most importantly – the media reports that are generated every day (see e.g. 
Kenski 2006a).  
How to study campaign dynamics has been a great challenge for researchers of 
electoral behaviour for a long time. Cross-section surveys usually capture only one (or 
a few) time points during a campaign and they do not allow drawing conclusions with 
regard to change in individual behaviour. Panel designs in turn do allow the analysis of 
changes in individual behaviour but suffer from panel attrition – people dropping out 
from the panel in a non-random way and thus biasing the sample – and panel 
conditioning – the fact that being in the panel might shape respondents’ behaviour (e.g. 
making them more likely to vote or increasing political awareness).7 In addition, the 
number of panel waves is limited and the timing of the waves cannot be planned in a 
way that captures all the main campaign events, as it is not necessarily known in 
advance what the important campaign events will be and because there is a limit as to 
how often the same respondents can be contacted. The analysis of campaign 
dynamics therefore calls for instruments that allow both a finer-grained measurement, 
as well as the detection of possible short-term effects. With the use of the RCS design 
                                                
 
 
6 The first RCS was conducted as part of the American National Election Study in 1984. Since then the 
design has become increasingly popular. RCS studies with the aim to analyse campaign dynamics were 
realized in a number of countries (e.g. Canada, Great Britain, New Zealand, Italy, or Germany) and others 
are in the planning stage (for an overview, see Schmitt-Beck et al. 2010). 
7 For an overview of studies on both panel attrition and panel conditioning, see e.g. Das et al. 2011, for 
panel effects in election surveys, see e.g. Bartels 1999. 
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it becomes possible to study campaign effects on a day-to-day basis, by linking them 
directly with subsequent opinion changes. The RCS thus allows researchers to watch a 
campaign evolve (Winneg et al. 2006: 33). 
The idea of an RCS is simple: A regular cross-section is spread over “an a priori 
defined period of time in such a way that not only the entire sample, but also the 
respondents interviewed on a given day of the field period constitute random samples 
(Schmitt-Beck et al. 2006: 13-14).”8 Interviews realised on different field days should 
therefore differ in nothing except the date, or in other words: the basic sample 
characteristics of the daily samples should not vary systematically (see e.g. Kenski 
2006b: 73). If this is the case, all changes in perceptions or attitudes that are identified 
over time can have only two sources: random sampling error or real change under the 
influence of campaign events. And these can be separated by appropriate statistical 
methods (Schmitt-Beck et al. 2006: 20; see also Johnston et al. 1992; Brady and 
Johnston 2006; Romer et al. 2004). When it comes to the data collection, the following 
requirements have to be met: 
(1) New blocks of randomly drawn addresses, often called “replicates”, are released on 
each field day and they are used for a specific pre-defined period of time. The number 
of addresses must thereby be large enough to avoid small-N problems while analysing 
the data. 
(2) The fieldwork must be carried out according to a strict contact scheme, to ensure 
that every address has the same probability to be contacted. The survey company is 
therefore obliged to make a fixed number of attempts every day to contact every 
address in a given replicate, spread across fixed time-slots. It must also be ensured 
that citizens who are hard to reach (such as full-time workers or singles) can also be 
interviewed, and addresses thus need to be kept open for a sufficiently long period of 
time. However, this presents no problem to the logic of the RCS, quite the contrary. 
Only through a somewhat stable mix of fresh and older addresses – and hence of 
respondents who are easy and respondents who are harder to reach – the daily 
samples become comparable, and thus meet the requirement of random samples.  
In this second point the RCS design differs significantly from conventional cross-
sections, in which all the addresses are usually released “en bloc“. The daily release of 
new addresses and the strict contact scheme moreover predetermine the use of 
computer assisted telephone interviews (CATI) as survey mode. However, first trials 
with online surveys have led to promising results (see e.g. Faas and Blumenberg 2012; 
Johnston 2008). 
1.2. Advantages and Limitations 
In comparison with more traditional designs (for an overview, see Kenski 2006a: 58-
65), the RCS offers a number of advantages, but also one major limitation. To start with 
                                                
 
 
8 In principle an RCS might also be conducted on a weekly basis, but due the nature of political campaigns 
(„many things happen in the news environment daily“), the use of the day as the unit of the release 
schedule seems more appropriate (Kenski 2006a: 60). Incompatible with the logic of the RCS, however, 
are uneven intervals between the measurement points (Schmitt-Beck et al. 2006: 18). 
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an obvious advantage, the tight temporal spacing of the interviews in an RCS allows a 
much more fine-grained analysis of aggregate shifts than both panels and repeated 
cross-sections. In the context of the latter two, the interviews are usually not conducted 
according to a strict contact scheme. Apart from this, the successive waves of panels 
or repeated cross-sections do not necessarily cover the whole campaign period, as 
already mentioned. This makes it very hard for a researcher to identify single events 
that might have caused an observed change in the citizens’ opinions or attitudes 
between two measurement points. The RCS therefore appears to be the only design at 
the time that allows the detection of possible short-term effects as well as the analysis 
of unexpected events, be they of a political or a more general nature, which have the 
potential to affect the citizens’ voting behaviour. Furthermore, the RCS design avoids 
conditioning effects since all respondents are new to the survey (Brady and Johnston 
2006: 164). 
Another big advantage of the RCS design is the analytical flexibility that the data offer a 
researcher. They may be used directly, to identify trends in the citizens’ opinions over 
the course of a campaign (and to visualize them, if desired), or, as Schmitt-Beck et al. 
(2010: 5) note, they may be aggregated according to either formal or substantive 
criteria.9 In general, any accumulation of consecutive daily samples is possible. The 
day of the interview also has the potential to serve as an anchor to link a respondent’s 
opinions with possible explanatory factors on the context level, such as media reports 
or pre-election polls.10 RCS data are therefore well suited for linkages with additional 
data sources such as a media content analysis (see e.g. Dobrzynska et al. 2003). 
However, the basic RCS design also has a significant limitation, especially in 
comparison with a panel survey: It does not allow the analysis of individual changes. 
Since every respondent is interviewed only once in the course of a campaign, the data 
merely allow claims about aggregate changes in specific groups of voters or the 
electorate as a whole (Schmitt-Beck et al. 2006: 21). However, it is noted that 
aggregate changes also are hard to detect, since the number of respondents in the 
daily samples is usually relatively small – in the case of the Swiss study 100 interviews 
on average. Any sample of such a size may produce a large error and campaign 
effects have to be large to overcome the random error. In addition, RCS surveys are 
comparatively expensive and require more planning than a more traditional design 
(Kenski 2006a: 61).  
While small samples and high costs will remain an issue in any scenario, the limitation 
stemming from the fact that the basic RCS cannot capture individual change can be 
overcome relatively easily with an extension of the design with a complementary post-
election panel wave. Such a combination has proven to be an excellent method to 
analyse campaign dynamics in recent years, since it allows researchers to take 
                                                
 
 
9 An example for the former would be a week-wise clustering of respondents, e.g. to avoid possible small 
N problems. A thorough discussion of the necessary number of cases and the issue of statistical power 
can be found in Zaller (2002). A comparison of the expectations of all the respondents that were 
interviewed before and after the publication of the results of a pre-election poll on the other hand might be 
an example for the latter. 
10 For the analysis of the data, the replicates mentioned in Chapter 1.1 are no longer important. 
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advantage of both the benefits of panel and RCS designs (see e.g. Johnston 2001).11 
Therefore such a combined design was also implemented in Switzerland’s first RCS in 
an electoral context, which will be outlined in the following chapter. 
2. Fieldwork: Experiences and challenges 
2.1. General design 
While the idea of an RCS is quite simple in theory, the practical implementation of the 
design requires a number of important decisions to be taken. 
(1) The first is to decide how many interviews are wanted and over how many days. 
Ideally, an RCS spans over a very long period with a high number of interviews every 
day. However, every survey has financial constraints and therefore the number of days 
and interviews has to be limited. In the framework of the 2011 Selects project, we 
opted to cover 41 days with a target of 100 interviews per day. We did not want to go 
below 100 interviews per day because Switzerland has a multi-member party system 
and in general turnout is also low. This requires a relatively high number of daily 
interviews so as to meaningfully capture the number of individuals who plan to vote or 
have voted for a particular party. Regarding the field time, we wanted to cover the final 
phase of the electoral campaign. In Switzerland, this is dependent on the school 
summer holiday calendar. Summer holidays last until mid/end August, depending on 
the canton, but in general, parties do not launch their final campaigns before 
September, because it is difficult to reach people with political messages during the 
summer holiday. We thus started the interviews on Monday 12 September 2011 and 
ended on Saturday 22 October 2011, the day before the elections. While general 
surveys are usually conducted in three languages in Switzerland, we decided to limit 
the study to the French and German speaking part and leave the Italian part out, which 
amounts to about 7 percent of the population. This was done to facilitate fieldwork and 
because the number of interviews in the Italian speaking part would have been too 
small to obtain meaningful results. 
 
(2) One of the trickiest decisions was to choose the number of addresses to be added 
every day and how the addresses should subsequently be treated. There was no 
experience in Switzerland for this kind of design and experience from other countries 
cannot be easily transferred. In addition, there was still scarce experience with the new 
sampling frame (see next section). In order to plan the fieldwork, we therefore had to 
make assumptions about both the expected response rates and when interviews could 
actually be conducted with a sample member. Contrary to other surveys, it is 
problematic to change the procedure and adapt designs  once the fieldwork has started 
if difficulties occur in this type of survey because this can corrupt the entire design and 
have long term consequences (see Wagner 2008, Groves and Heringa 2006). Adding 
                                                
 
 
11 Faas and Blumenberg (2012) recently tested an even further integration of the advantages of the two 
designs by launching repeated panels waves within the logic of an RCS to analyze the campaign in the 
run-up to the Baden-Wuerttemberg state election. 
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too few or too many addresses has consequences for the total duration that each 
address is active. In turn, changing the treatment of addresses during the fieldwork 
influences the probability of contact and interview for each address.  
 
(3) How long to keep the addresses in the field? We decided on keeping each address 
open for two weeks, after which the address was deactivated if no contact had been 
made. We assumed that after two weeks without contacts, it was unlikely that we 
establish a contact with that address at all. We then also made predictions about 
response rates over the two-week period and per day. This made it possible to reach 
an estimate about the number of addresses needed in total and about the number of 
addresses to be added every day. We then established a contact scheme that provides 
five attempts to contact each address each day. Each address is contacted only once 
during each fixed time slot. Those time slots were 9am-12pm, 12pm-2pm, 2pm-5pm, 
5pm-7pm, and 7pm-9pm on weekdays and 10am-12pm, 12pm-2pm, and 2pm-5pm on 
Saturday and Sunday. 
A last decision to make was whether to run a standalone RCS or to combine it with a 
pre-campaign panel or post-election component. Some advocates of the RCS design 
argue that in order to study campaign effects there should be a measurement of 
preferences prior to the campaign, which can then be combined with the preference 
measured during the RCS. Such a design would, among other things, allow capturing 
individual shifts in the voters’ opinions or attitudes. While this is a valid argument, there 
are some disadvantages to this proposition. As discussed, panels traditionally suffer 
from both panel conditioning and panel attrition, which increase the risks of biasing the 
results. This may be especially problematic in political surveys, since key political 
variables such as turnout and political interest may be affected (see e.g. Bartels 1999). 
Because we did not want to take the risk to bias the RCS we opted not to run a pre-
RCS panel interview. We did however implement a post-election panel component to 
inquire about actual voting behaviour in a short interview. 
2.2. The new sampling frame 
For the Selects 2011 surveys it was possible for the first time to use a new sampling 
frame managed by the Federal Statistical Office (FSO). The new sampling frame is 
established as a by-product of the new register based census. Information from the 
local population registers is centralized four times a year and the register includes 
some key information on all the residents such as date of birth, gender, municipality of 
birth, nationality, marital status, and correspondence language, in addition to the 
names and addresses. While mainly used by the FSO under specific conditions, this 
sample frame is also available for other projects. In the case of academic research, the 
project needs to be either a regular scientific research project financed and considered 
of national importance by the Swiss national science foundation (SNSF) or an 
international research project co-financed by the SNSF.12 
                                                
 
 
12 See the Verordnung über die Durchführung von statistischen Erhebungen des Bundes, Art. 13c 
(http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/sr/431_012_1/a13c.html - In German, French, and Italian) 
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This new sampling frame offers a number of advantages (see also Lipps et al. 2013, 
Roberts et al. 2013): 
(1) The sample base offers practically one hundred percent coverage of Swiss 
residents and the information is very accurate. Indeed, residents in Switzerland by law 
have to officially register in a community. There are however people who may not 
necessarily live and be reachable where they are registered, either because they have 
a second home, are weekly commuters, or are registered for various reasons in 
another place (such as convenience, avoiding taxes, or other benefits). 
(2) It is possible to directly draw samples based on individuals instead of the usual two-
step procedure of sampling households from telephone registers and then individuals 
within a household. This saves time and, reduces the error of doing the interview with 
the “wrong” person, and decreases the number of contacts needed and thus of 
occasions for refusals. 
(3) Sampling can be more specific because additional demographic information is 
available and can be used to stratify the sample or draw a sample among sub-groups. 
For Selects 2011, it was possible to draw a sample restricted to Swiss citizens 18 years 
or older, the population of interest in an election survey. In addition, it is not necessary 
to ask respondents about some of the socio-demographics questions or this 
information can be used to double check interviewer performance. 
The main downside is that the register does not include the telephone numbers needed 
for CATI interviews. The numbers thus need to be added in a separate step. The FSO 
uses a register of officially registered landline numbers and matches those numbers to 
the drawn sample. Through this procedure the FSO delivered 69% of the addresses in 
the sample with a telephone number. To improve coverage, the survey company made 
supplementary efforts to retrieve additional numbers using commercial software based 
on the public registers as well as telemarketing directories. As a consequence, it was 
possible to add another 16 percent of telephone numbers, so in total telephone 
numbers were available for 85% of the sample.  
Nevertheless this leaves a very substantial number (15 percent) of sampled individuals 
without a valid telephone number and as a consequence it was not possible to contact 
those people in the RCS. The population without a telephone number is not a random 
selection either, but has some specific socio-demographic characteristics. In our 
sample, 25 to 35 year old singles in city centres born outside Switzerland are more 
likely to not have a telephone number than the youngest age group or the over 45 old, 
married, and living on the countryside (Lipps et al. 2013). The under-coverage is most 
significant in the 25 to 35 age group, many of which have become part of the “cell 
phone only” population and thus cannot be contacted anymore. 
2.3. Day-to-day fieldwork 
We now turn to the description of the fieldwork and present figures regarding the most 
important aspects of our experience with the RCS fieldwork. Firstly, Figure 1 shows the 
number of completed interviews, as well as the planned and actual number of 
addresses loaded during the field period. This illustrates how easy or difficult it is to 
reach the target of 100 interviews on any given day, as well as how we adapted the 
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number of addresses and the effects of these adaptations on the subsequent number 
of interviews. 
As is evident from Figure 1, it is not an easy task to consistently meet the target 
number of interviews when following the RCS design. Indeed, during the field period, 
the number of interviews varied between 51 and 177 interviews. Due to the fixed 
contact scheme, it was not possible to increase effort only during the weekends and 
decrease it during the weekdays so as not to exceed the 100 target interviews. Thus it 
was necessary to add to the overall number of addresses so as to increase the number 
of interviews during weekends but at the same time this caused a spike on Mondays 
when people were again more easily reachable. Despite adding addresses, we were 
unable to reach the target of 100 interviews during the weekends, except for the two 
last Saturdays, which indicates that it might be necessary to revise the protocol for 
conducting interviews on weekends. However, this is delicate, both due to respondents 
being unhappy about being called during this time and due to the risk of influencing the 
mix of respondents.  
Figure 1 also shows the number of addresses that were initially planned to be added 
each day, as well as the actual figures from the fieldwork. The dimension of the 
adjustments made roughly corresponds to a 10 percent increase beginning on the 5th 
day of fieldwork, followed by a 20 percent increase beginning on the Sunday of the 
second week, and an increase of about one third during the two last weeks. It could be 
argued that it was quickly evident that the number of addresses was insufficient and 
that increases should have been done before the 5th day. The late reaction was partly 
due to insufficient resources and monitoring. However, as we have seen, the exact 
effects of adding addresses are difficult to predict and adjustments have therefore to be 
done with much care. It is also known that a certain build-up time is necessary in RCS 
studies to get a somewhat stable mix of easy and hard to reach addresses (see also 
Chapter 3.1), which partly accounts for the low figures in the beginning. A too rapid 
increase could jeopardize the mix of addresses. At any rate, the challenges we 
encountered clearly underline the importance of following the advancement of the field 
closely and being able to make adjustments when needed. 
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Figure 1: Number of interviews, number of addresses initially planned, and number of 
addresses actually loaded by day of fieldwork (vertical bars indicate Sundays) 
 
 
When it comes to the number of calls needed to complete an interview, Figure 2 shows 
that this number was relatively high with regard to the RCS, at least when comparing it 
to the traditional post-electoral survey (PES): over 50 percent of the interviews were 
realized after eight calls or more, while in the PES more than half of the interviews 
were realized with five calls or less. In the RCS, only around 6 percent of the interviews 
were conducted after the first call and almost 30 percent were conducted after more 
than 17 calls. In the PES, on the other hand, almost twice as many interviews (11 
percent) were realized with the first call, compared to the RCS. However, the response 
rates were similar in both surveys; the difference therefore seems to be more a 
consequence of non-contact than of non-cooperation. This finding can be explained by 
the strict contact scheme which leads to more calls with no contact at hours when it is 
unlikely to reach people, whereas in the PES, substantially more interviewers are 
working in the morning and in the evening in order to increase the number of calls 
during periods when people are easier to reach. 
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Figure 2: Number of calls necessary for interview 
 
As shown in Figure 3, about 39 percent of all interviews were conducted during the first 
day the address was  released to the field. After one week, a little less than 85 percent 
of the interviews had taken place. After the two weeks period that an address remains 
active, around 95 percent of the interviews were completed. The remaining 5 percent 
being appointments made after the two-week period. It could be argued that a one-
week period might be a sufficient fielding period. However, it is well known that easy to 
reach and hard to reach individuals differ in many aspects, including socio-
demographics and substantive variables, and the two-week period is thus seen as 
necessary to reach also these hardest to reach individuals. 
Figure 3: Days between the load of the address and completed interview 
 
We can see that the response rate remains quite stable across replicates (or in other 
words: across the days on which the addresses were released to the field), except for 
the final period (see Figure 4). This is because the addresses kept open less than the 
normal two-week period, as the fieldwork period is coming to an end. During the 30 first 
days, the rate oscillates between 29 and just over 40 percent and drops to about 19 
percent the last day. There is no clear effect regarding the day of the week the 
addresses were loaded and the response rate, which is as expected. Due to the limited 
time in the field of each address, and an even shorter period for the addresses loaded 
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at the end of the fieldwork, we would expect a lower overall response rate compared to 
the post-electoral study (35%). This is however not the case. The much shorter 
duration of the questionnaire (15 minutes versus 35 minutes) very probably explains to 
a great extent the stronger willingness of people to participate in the RCS study 
compared to the PES. 
Figure 4: Response rate by replicate 
 
 
The response rate was relatively low compared to our expectations, even after taking 
into consideration the specificities of an RCS study. A great variety of reasons 
contributed to this, and it is difficult to pinpoint a particular shortcoming in the fieldwork. 
However, as Figure 5 shows, refusals were the reason behind almost a third of the 
interviews that could not be conducted, which would point to a potential for 
improvement in this area. People citing availability issues or who could not be 
contacted accounted for about one fifth. About 6 percent of the people did not feel able 
to do the survey due reasons such as age or health. The rest of the losses were due to 
different issues with addresses and phone numbers (no dial tone, wrong address, etc.), 
as well as some pending appointments, which might have been scheduled by mistake 
by the interviewer to a date which was after the end of the fieldwork period. 
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Figure 5: Final status of loaded addresses in percentages 
 
 
2.4. Survey agency 
As an RCS is a relatively complex design, it puts high demands on the capability of 
survey agencies to handle the day-to-day fieldwork. One of the key challenges of this 
type of survey is that it follows a different procedure than most other CATI surveys. 
These usually have a start day, a pre-defined field period, and addresses are loaded at 
the beginning. In a classic post-electoral survey for instance, the goal is to get a 
maximum of interviews in the shortest possible period to make sure that people 
remember correctly their voting behaviour and that the elections are still “fresh” in 
respondents’ memories. Survey agencies are typically used to this kind of maximization 
of the number of interviews, and therefore following a fixed contact scheme is counter 
to their usual logic. For instance, if falling behind on the target one day, it is not simply 
possible add addresses to meet the target. Even when adding addresses later on, this 
has consequences for the next 14 days, it is necessary to fine-tune carefully. The 
number of measures to increase response rates is also very limited since these almost 
inevitably would lead to changes in the contact probabilities for addresses before and 
after the measures are in place. 
Several issues were found to be problematic in the field work: 
(1) The system with fixed time slots made it sometimes difficult for the survey agencies 
to plan the number of interviewers necessary because while it was clear how many 
address are loaded every day, it was not at all clear how many interviews would be 
done – and at what time of day. Sometimes interviewers had too few addresses to 
work with – which is costly for survey agencies – and sometimes too many, which 
made it difficult to follow the contact scheme properly. 
(2) The limited management capacity of both the survey agency and the Selects team 
to steer the survey proved to be a burden. While the RCS was in the field, the Selects 
team was at the same time busy preparing for the large post-election studies which 
included a substantial CATI post-election voter survey, a survey among Swiss living 
Success
31%
No tone, 
modem, fax
1%
Unable to 
contact
13%
Refusal
31%
Wrong address 
or not in target 
group
4%
Unknown
4%
Availability
8%
Ability
6%
Appointment
2%
 
 
15
abroad, an experimental online survey, as well as a candidate survey. With this 
workload, it was not always possible to carefully monitor the progress of the survey and 
to investigate the causes of the problems encountered. This would have been 
necessary in order to fine-tune the fieldwork on a day-to-day basis. The reporting was 
not defined clearly beforehand either, in terms of content and frequency, to take 
informed decisions. 
(3) Our assumptions regarding response rates proved to be too optimistic. It was never 
possible to achieve a response rate as high as 50 percent of the loaded interviews 
during the 14 days each address was loaded. In fact, the response rate was only 30 
percent, substantially lower than what we had hoped for. It is not possible to state 
clearly why this was the case, losses occurred at all stages of the interview process. 
The number of refusals was however quite high, especially for a relatively short 
interview. We thus believe the training of the interviewers, especially with regards to 
convincing participants, to be something that needs to be focused on more in the 
future. 
(4) A further problem we encountered was the increase of refusals and non-contact 
during the weekends, especially on Sundays (see Figure 1). Doing interviews on a 
Sunday is against the code of conduct of the survey agencies and one needs good 
arguments for an exception. In most cantons, it is even necessary to ask for an official 
permission. For the RCS, the argument was that Sunday newspapers are very 
important for the campaigns in Switzerland and thus we wanted to capture the effects 
on the same day. Many people, however, did not appreciate at all being called by a 
survey agency on a Sunday, which can be seen clearly in the drop in the number of 
interviews. In order to compensate for those losses, it would have been possible to 
boost the Sunday sample. However, there would have been a backlash for such a 
measure as the number of interviews conducted on Mondays would have gone even 
higher than they already did. 
(5) We opted for a very high number of contacts in the RCS (which is again against the 
code of conduct of survey agencies). Respondents were called up to 70 times. Since 
phones that show call information are now common, this was also a source of 
complaints when people were absent for longer periods and saw that they had been 
called many times, including on weekends and evenings. 
2.5. Challenges ahead 
Based on our experience with the RCS design, we see a number of challenges ahead: 
How many interviews on how many days? The variance of many key variables remains 
rather low in the course of the entire field period (see Chapter 3.2). In addition, the 
many parties competing for elections and the low turnout require a high number of 
interviews per day. These key parameters need to be discussed when planning a 
future RCS survey in Switzerland.  
How to plan and to monitor the field work? Both a closer collaboration with the survey 
agency and a closer monitoring should be sought. Each step of the survey needs to be 
planned in detail with the survey company. This includes procedures prior and during 
the field period as well as reporting systems and possible measures to be taken if 
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targets are not met. It also includes a solid interviewer training at the beginning of the 
field work, with a special focus on convincing people to participate.  
How far do we go when hunting respondents? Contacting people as many times and 
also on the weekends proved to be a challenge as some people were offended by this. 
Whether it makes sense to contact people on Sundays in the future will have to be 
discussed, even when we see that this did not have a negative influence on the 
response rates in general: It was not more difficult to conduct interviews with the 
addresses that were added on Sundays although it was more difficult to conduct 
interviews on Sundays. 
The future of CATI surveys on landline phones? On a more general level, the number 
of people without a known telephone number and who cannot be contacted is already a 
problem now and will become a greater problem in the future (see Ernst Staehli 2012; 
Von der Lippe et al. 2011). For an RCS, options are more limited than for other types of 
surveys, because with mixed-mode designs or with other types of surveys (such as 
online surveys), it is more difficult to control that every citizen’s probability to get 
contacted and interviewed remains stable. 
3. Quality of the data 
After having gone through the description of the data collection in the Swiss RCS, the 
goal of the next section is to examine the data quality. To evaluate the quality of the 
data collected during an RCS, the primary task is to verify if the core premise of the 
design was respected: that both the inclusion of a respondent’s address in the sample 
as well as the date on which he or she is contacted for an interview are products of 
random selection. If this is the case, the daily samples should be relatively stable in 
their structure. Therefore only random variations with regard to their socio-demographic 
composition are permissible (Schmitt-Beck et al. 2010: 15-16). To meet this 
requirement, the daily samples need to fulfill two compelling properties: 
(1) They must consist of a somewhat stable mix of respondents that are easy and such 
that are harder to reach.  
(2) The socio-demographic characteristics of their members must not vary significantly 
over the course of the campaign. 
Whether these two conditions – which, of course, are closely related – are fulfilled, and 
if the data collected in the run-up to the 2011 National Council elections in Switzerland 
are able to deliver what the RCS design promises, will be analyzed in the following two 
chapters. 
3.1. Accessibility of the respondents 
Every survey shows that some respondents are easy to reach while it is more 
demanding to get a hold of others. In a conventional survey this is solved through 
adding all addresses at once and then stretching the fieldwork until most sample 
members finally cooperate. In an RCS, however, “the proportion of respondents who 
completed an interview after having been called only a few times and those who 
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completed an interview after being called numerous times” needs to be stable (Kenski 
2006b: 73). This is important, because “the respondents who answer the survey in the 
initial few calls may be different from those who are harder to reach” (p. 76). Each daily 
sample, in order to be random, should therefore consist of new and older addresses 
assuming that the older addresses include individuals who are more difficult to reach. 
As we can show in Figure 6, it took about a week until the daily samples consisted of a 
somewhat stable mix of fresh and older addresses – and hence of respondents who 
were easy and respondents who were harder to reach.13 This pattern is typical for RCS 
designs, since at the beginning of the field period the daily samples solely consist of 
respondents who have been reached with the first few calls. However, the fact that in 
these first days the daily samples are different from the other daily samples must be 
taken into account when analysing the data. Various authors recommend that they 
should not be included when analysing the data across time (Kenski 2006b: 76; see 
also Johnston and Brady 2002; Schmitt-Beck et al. 2006), however, given that they still 
represent a random selection of individuals this may be a somewhat radical decision. In 
the following subchapter, we will therefore analyse to what extent both the in- an 
exclusion of the first seven days affect the quality of the collected data. 
Figure 6: The daily mix of fresh and older addresses 
 
3.2. Stability of socio-demographic characteristics over time 
If the daily samples are comparable with regard to their composition, the socio-
demographic characteristics of their respective members must not vary significantly 
over the course of the campaign. Or in other words: they must not be correlated with 
the day of the interview. To verify whether this is the case, we use graphical smoothing 
techniques to get a first visual impression of the stability of the socio-demographic 
characteristics over time. As shown in Figure 7, which in fact also contains the first 
days of the study, there are no major differences over the course of the campaign with 
                                                
 
 
13 For the sake of a better readability, the graph is limited to the first three weeks of the field period. 
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regard to the respondents’ spoken language, their gender, their marital status or their 
age.14 The same goes for all other characteristics we tested for. However, some days 
of the week proved to be particularly suitable to contact certain groups of voters. This 
explains most of the fluctuation with regard to the actual daily averages. On Saturdays, 
for example, it was generally easier to reach young citizens and singles, as the figure 
shows as well. However, the visual analysis of the distribution of the socio-
demographic characteristics across the daily samples does not indicate any systematic 
effects of the temporal stage of the campaign on the composition of the daily samples. 
Figure 7: Stability of socio-demographic characteristics over time 
 
To check whether the impression of stability with regard to socio-demographic 
characteristics also withstands an inferential statistical test, we applied a method that 
had already been used in the framework of several German Elections (Schmitt-Beck et 
al. 2006, 2010; Faas and Blumenberg 2012). For every possible pair of field days we 
compared the daily proportions of a number of socio-demographic characteristics and 
identified all those pairs that showed a significant deviation. Statistically, a significant 
deviation would be expected in five percent of all the possible pairs due to chance 
alone.15 
                                                
 
 
14 The thin lines in Figure 7 depict the actual daily averages, while the thicker lines show the smoothed 
trends over the course of the campaign. The latter were created with a so-called LOWESS smoother 
(locally weighted scatterplot smoother; bandwith 0.5). This procedure was developed by Cleveland (1979) 
and proved to be particularly useful for the analysis of RCS data (see e.g. Brady and Johnston 2002; 
Schmitt-Beck et al. 2006, 2010). The vertical thin lines in the graph indicate the five last Sundays prior to 
the Election Day on 23 October 2011. 
15 A significant deviation exists if the coefficient of the dummy variable that separates between the two field 
days is beyond the 95 percent confidence interval. A detailed description of the procedure can be found in 
Schmitt-Beck et al. (2010: 18). 
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Table 11: Proportion of significant differences in pair-wise comparison of field days 
(p < 0.05, figures in percentages) 
  every weekday
without 
weekends
without first
 7 days
without first 7 days 
and weekends
Sex 1.7 1.1 0.7 1.3
Age 4.5 2.3 4.8 2.3
Language: German 3.3 2.1 4.1 3.0
Urban 2.1 1.4 2.3 1.7
Marital status: Single 3.9 2.5 4.5 3.0
Employment: Full time 3.9 3.7 3.9 4.7
Education: University level 1.8 1.6 0.4 0.7
Number of pairs 820 435 561 300
As Table 1 shows, for none of the characteristics is this five percent margin exceeded – 
irrespectively of whether the weekends and/or the first seven days are excluded from 
the analysis. While dropping the weekends from the full sample leads to a slight 
improvement of all values, which can be explained with the above mentioned 
differences in the accessibility of certain groups of individuals and the generally lower 
willingness to participate in a survey (see Chapter 2.4), the exclusion of weekends from 
the reduced sample (without the first seven days) produces a somewhat mixed picture. 
In general, the exclusion of the first field days (see Chapter 3.1) only partially leads to 
the expected improvement of the values (e.g. with regard to gender or education). This 
might be a hint that possible outliers with regard to the other characteristics are not 
necessarily to be found within these first days only. As Figure 8 shows, this assumption 
proves to be correct for two out of the three days with the highest total number of 
significant deviations to other field days – but not for the most glaring outlier.16 Day 7, 
the first Sunday, is the field day with the highest total number of significant deviations, 
and taking into account that the daily mix of fresh and older addresses was far from 
stable during the first week (see Figure 6), some users of the RCS data may opt for the 
exclusion of the first days from the analysis. The respondents interviewed within the 
first seven days will therefore not be included in the analyses that will follow in Chapter 
4.1. 
                                                
 
 
16 The fact that the total number of significant deviations is always lower in the reduced sample is a 
consequence of the pair-wise nature of the comparison. If, for example, a day in the first week reveals a 
significant deviation compared to a day in the fourth week, the exclusion of the first seven days will also 
reduce the total number of deviations in the fourth week. The daily numbers of deviations in the two 
samples would only be identical if none of the pairs that showed a significant deviation would include one 
of the first seven field days. 
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Figure 8: Total number of significant deviations per field day 
 
To sum up, the results of our statistical test with regard to the comparability of the daily 
samples can be viewed as satisfactory, since the proportion of significant differences 
between the field days remains below the five percent margin across-the-board. The 
data collected during Switzerland’s first RCS therefore seem to deliver what the design 
promises. 
4. Potential for analyses 
The data collected during the RCS survey in the run-up to the 2011 National Council 
elections offer the possibility for a wide range of analyses. On one hand, the 
hierarchical structure of the RCS data – respondents are nested within field days – 
allow the detection of changes in the respondents’ attitudes and intentions over the 
course of the campaign, and the linkage of these changes with possible explanatory 
factors such as media content or published poll results, using the respective day of the 
interview as an anchor. On the other hand, the panel component also allows a pre-
post-election comparison of some of those attitudes, as well as of the stated vote 
intentions and a respondent’s actual vote choice (or abstention). The following three 
subchapters will therefore shed light on the variance observed with regard to a number 
of key variables and point out their analytical potential. They will also indicate the 
potential of both the post-election panel wave, as well as the media content analysis 
that was carried out parallel to the RCS, for possible future analyses 
4.1. Variance of key variables 
An obvious starting point for the discussion of possible key variables for future 
analyses is the intention to participate in an election as well as the intention to vote for 
a certain party – the key dependent variables of numerous electoral studies. As shown 
in Figure 9, the respondents’ intentions to participate in the 2011 National Council 
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election were quite stable at the beginning of the campaign period, before they slightly 
diminished in the last two weeks prior to election day. A possible explanation would be 
that many of the citizens who had the intention to vote already did so at this time. The 
remaining respondents might therefore belong to the group of citizens who is more 
likely not to vote. The opposite pattern can be observed with regard to the intention to 
abstain. The proportion of respondents who didn’t know (yet) if they would participate 
at the day of the interview stayed more or less stable over the whole time.17 Due to the 
widely used possibilities of postal voting in Switzerland (see e.g. Lutz 2012: 48), some 
respondents had already cast their ballots at the day of the interview. Since those 
respondents are no longer able to express an intention to participate, they were 
excluded from the analysis, together with all the 474 respondents that were interviewed 
in the first seven field days. The analysis was therefore restricted to the intentions of 
the remaining 2786 respondents. 
Figure 9: Intentions to participate and to abstain 
 
With regard to the parties those respondents intended to vote for at the day of the 
interview, Figure 10 shows that there were only marginal shifts (+/- 2 percentage points 
across all parties) on the aggregate level in the course of the campaign.18 More 
interesting is the ranking order of the parties. In the case of the four largest parties 
(SVP, SP, FDP, and CVP), it did not change anymore. Regarding the respondents’ 
intentions to vote for the Greens, the GLP, and the BDP, however, there were various 
shifts that changed the ranking order of the three parties – at least for a certain period 
of time. Apart from that, the low degree of net changes at the aggregate level does not 
necessarily imply that there were as few changes at the individual level. Quite the 
                                                
 
 
17 All the respondents who answered the question regarding their intention to participate with “Certainly” or 
“Rather sure” were coded as having the intention to participate. The respondents who answered with 
“Rather not” or “Certainly not” were coded as having an intention to abstain. The respondents who 
answered “Maybe” or “Don’t know” were coded as not knowing (yet) if they intend to vote or to abstain. 
18 The markers in Figure 10 (as well as the ones in Figure 12) are only used to increase the distinctness of 
the plotted lines. Like in the graphs shown on the following pages, those lines are smoothed trend lines, 
depicting moving averages, no directly observable values. 
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contrary: As the first results of the Selects 2011 project suggest, last-minute vote shifts 
– to be understood as differences between a respondent’s stated vote intention and his 
or her (self-declared) actual vote choice or abstention – were fairly common. According 
to Lutz (2012: 55-56), some of the parties lost up to 40 percent of their potential voters 
during the hot phase of the campaign. 
Figure 10: Vote intentions for major seven parties 
 
A possible explanatory factor for shifts in respondents’ intentions to vote for a certain 
party may be the issues most important to a respondent – e.g. because he or she 
considers them as a problem – and their salience in the media (for an overview on 
issue voting, see Kriesi and Sciarini 2004). Figure 11 shows the four issues that were 
most often mentioned by the respondents as Switzerland’s most important problems 
(MIPs) at the time of the interview: immigration, the economy, the environment, and 
social security.19 While immigration was the highest-ranking issue over the whole 
campaign period, the economic issue, which ranked second at the beginning of the 
campaign, steadily lost importance. The opposite can be observed for the social 
security issue, which gained in importance, although only to a small extent. The most 
noticeable shift occurred with regard to the perceived importance of the environment. 
Since this category (see footnote 21) also contains the energy issues, one might 
suspect that the remarkable shift may have been a consequence of the lively debate in 
the Council of States concerning Switzerland’s planned nuclear phase-out and the 
respective media coverage in the follow-up of the decision that was taken on 
September 28.20 To a certain degree, this assumption is confirmed by the more or less 
                                                
 
 
19 Together these four issues cover almost two thirds of all the answers (1st and 2nd mentions) to the 
respective open question in the RCS. They were originally translated into 73 separate codes and later 
recoded into 17 broader categories such as the ones shown in Figure 11. 
20 To better identify possible turning points in the respondents’ perceptions, the following graphs depict so-
called prior moving averages (PMA’s). This special type of moving average takes into account the day of 
the interview as well as a certain number of days before (see e.g. Brady and Johnston 2006). 
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identical pattern of the nuclear phase-out issue alone (thin solid line in the graph), if it is 
analysed independent of the other environmental issues. However, to analyse if the 
temporary rise of the environment/energy issue really is related to the discussions in 
the Council of States, and how it affected the respondents’ voting behaviour, the RCS 
data needs to be linked with the media analysis (see Chapter 4.3). 
Figure 8: The four most important problems (1st and 2nd mentions) 
 
A key variable with regard to MIPs is the competence that the respondents assign a 
party to handle this issue. While some issues might be “owned” by a party over a 
prolonged period of time (on issue ownership, see e.g. Budge and Farlie 1983; Petrocik 
1996), others may be new and therefore “vacant”. Figure 12 shows the shifts in the 
overall handling competence assigned to the major seven parties, without 
distinguishing between the individual issues perceived as MIP. Two things catch one’s 
eyes: There are noticeable shifts in the level of competence assigned to the two 
strongest parties, the SP and the SVP, over the course of the campaign, and the 
perceived competence of the BDP to handle any issue seems to be close to inexistent. 
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Figure 9: Parties most competent to handle the MIP (1st and 2nd mentions) 
 
 
Much more interesting is the analysis of the competence assigned to certain parties to 
handle one specific issue. To demonstrate the potential of the RCS data in this regard, 
Figure 13 takes up the example of the environment/energy issue again and shows 
which parties are perceived as most competent to handle it. Remarkably, the rates of 
both parties that label themselves as “green”, the Greens and the Green-Liberals, 
dropped significantly in the days prior and after the Council of States’ decision in favour 
of Switzerland’s nuclear phase-out, whereas other parties such as the CVP, which 
were never among the advocates of a nuclear phase-out until the Fukushima Daiichi 
disaster, suddenly seemed more competent to handle this issue in the eyes of the 
electorate. However, as the graph shows as well, these shifts were of a short duration 
only and the Greens never lost their “traditional” ownership of the environment/energy 
issue. 
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Figure 10: Parties most competent to handle the environment/energy issue 
 
The last key variable we will discuss with regard to the variance observed over the 
course of the campaign is the perception of the published results of pre-election polls. 
Compared to other countries, especially the United States, but also Germany, polls are 
rather rare in Switzerland. During the field time of the rolling cross-section survey, only 
two were published: one in the “Sonntagszeitung” on 25 September and the seventh 
and last wave of the “Wahlbarometer” on 12 October. 
 
Figure 11: Perception of pre-election polls 
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Based solely on the smoothed trend depicted in Figure 14, only the publication of the 
“Wahlbarometer” seems to have been perceived by the respondents.21 However, the 
picture is slightly clearer if one takes into account the parties mentioned as the 
expected winners and losers of the election (according to the poll). As Figure 15 
shows, the respondents who stated that they have seen a poll in the last few days prior 
to the interview not only named the correct winners (GLP and BDP) and loser (FDP) 
according to the results of the “Wahlbarometer”, they also correctly identified the SVP 
as one of the expected losers of the election according to the forecast published in the 
“Sonntagszeitung”. Our initial assessment, that the first poll was not perceived by the 
respondents, may therefore need more study. 
Figure 12: Expected winners and losers of the election according to the polls 
 
In summary, the key variables discussed in this chapter reveal considerable potential 
for further analyses on both the aggregate as well as the individual level. Especially in 
view of the latter, the panel component of the RCS and the media content analysis that 
was carried out parallel to the survey might be of particular interest as well. Therefore 
their potential will be separately discussed in the next two subchapters. 
4.2. Pre-post comparison 
As already mentioned, the RCS contained an additional post-election panel wave. 
Every respondent who had not yet voted at the day of the (pre-election) interview (N = 
3260) was contacted again in the days after the Election Day and was asked for his or 
her actual vote choice. Almost 80 percent of those eligible agreed to the second 
interview. These 2434 cases can therefore be used as a panel, which allows for a pre-
post comparison with regard to a number of variables, including the respondents’ party 
                                                
 
 
21 A total number of 799 respondents stated that they have seen “any polls in the last few days” (the first 
seven days in the field were again excluded from the analysis). Remarkably, the daily share always 
oscillated around a value of .2 – even if there were no polls published in the days before (Lutz 2012: 59). 
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choice, the issues perceived as most important problems, and the parties perceived as 
most competent to handle those issues. Regarding possible differences between the 
respondents’ stated intentions prior to the Election Day and their actual vote choice, the 
panel data reveal notable changes. As shown in Table 2, 263 respondents intended to 
abstain. That corresponds to 13 percent of the 2050 remaining respondents after the 
first seven field days were excluded from the analysis. 1179 respondents (58 percent) 
intended to vote for one of the seven major parties, and 194 respondents (9 percent) 
for one of the minor parties. 414 respondents (20 percent) didn’t know yet or didn’t 
answer to the respective question. 
Table 2: Last minute vote shifts (pre-post-election comparison) 
  Voted for major party X
Voted for 
major party Y
Voted for a 
minor party 
Abstained
Intention to vote for major 
party X (N=1179) 779 (66) 182 (15) 49 (4) 124 (11)
Intention to vote for a minor 
party (N=194) 104 (54) n.a. 59 (30) 15 (8)
Intention to abstain (N=263) 31 (12) n.a. 2 (1) 229 (87)
N = 2050; row percentages in parentheses 
If we compare these numbers with the (self-declared) actual voting behaviour of the 
respective respondents, we observe that 229 of the 263 respondents (87 percent) who 
intended to abstain actually did. 31 respondents (12 percent), however, decided to take 
part in the election: 29 of them cast their ballot for a major party, two of them for one of 
the minor parties. It is tempting to conclude that these respondents were mobilized in 
one way or another by the campaign. Regarding the 194 respondents who intended to 
vote for a minor party, we observe that 59 (30 percent) did so. 104 of them (54 percent) 
finally voted for a major party, and 15 of them (8 percent) abstained. The remaining 8 
percent didn’t answer the question. This shift from a minor to a major party might either 
be explained by strategic voting, especially in small constituencies, or by altered 
expectations with regard to the winners and losers of the elections, e.g. as a reaction to 
the publication of pre-election poll results.22 Of the 1179 respondents who intended to 
vote for one of the major parties, 961 (81 percent) declared that they did so in the post-
election interview. 799 of them (83 percent) voted for the party they intended to vote, 
182 of them (17 percent) for another major party. 49 (4 percent) out of the 1179 
respondents who intended to vote a major party finally cast their ballot for one of the 
minor parties, and 124 of them (11 percent) declared that they abstained. The 
remaining 4 percent didn’t answer the question. 
4.3. Link with media analysis 
If we want to study campaign effects on voting behaviour we need to have an idea 
what is going on in the campaign. Therefore, parallel to the RCS, that not only 
contained a wide range of questions concerning the decision making process and the 
                                                
 
 
22 The latter argument might also explain shifts from major to minor parties in the case that a certain 
respondent feels even more obliged to support a minor party after he learned about its hypothetical failure 
according to the polls. 
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respondents’ voting behaviour, but also their media consumption, an associated media 
content analysis was carried out. Since the budget for this analysis was very limited, 
we decided to focus on the campaign related in print- and online media during the 
same period as the RCS was in the field. This decision was motivated by the fact that 
media coverage is these media outlets is likely to create the highest amount of 
attention among a broader public. It would have been useful to also include campaign 
ads and posters. However, this would have been much more expensive. In addition, 
party campaigns mix up with personal candidates’ campaigns in the final period of the 
elections. The candidates have the primary goal to make them known through the 
personal campaign and usually present only a picture of themselves together with the 
list number they are running on and the party affiliation. Candidates often don’t even try 
to spread a political message. We also excluded electronic media (radio and TV), 
because the analysis of their content would have been very costly and is not very 
relevant in the Swiss context. The national radio and TV station have a very balanced 
reporting of party and campaign events. In addition, political advertising is not allowed 
in any electronic media.  
Between September 10 and October 22, 2011, the Institute of Mass Communication 
and Media Research (IPMZ) at the University of Zurich analysed the 28 most important 
newspapers and online-news pages in the German- and French-speaking part of 
Switzerland.23 All front-page articles as well as articles with a teaser on the front page 
were recorded, provided that they addressed issues relevant to the election. In total, 
the media sample contains 1922 articles, each of which has been classified on the 
basis of numerous variables that cover communication events, the political actors and 
their reputations, as well as the issues concerned. Linked with the data gathered during 
the RCS, for example by using the day of the interview as an anchor, this additional 
source of information has the potential to actually explain some of the changes one 
might observe with regard to the citizens’ attitudes and intentions.24  
Figure 16 gives an idea that there is substantial variation in campaign related 
reporting.25 At the beginning of the campaign, the economic situation was a very salient 
topic in the media, due to the spread of the financial crisis. In the middle of the 
campaign, nuclear energy was a central topic, which was related to a parliamentary 
debate. Towards the end of the campaign immigration was more frequently covered in 
the media and the campaign and the parties themselves became a topic of media 
reports.  
 
                                                
 
 
23 Italian-speaking media outlets were excluded from the sample, since the RCS study was limited to the 
German- and French-speaking parts of the country as well. 
24 A first attempt of combining RCS data with a media content analysis was made by Johnston et al. (1992) 
in the context of the 1988 Canadian elections. For more recent studies that focus, among other things, on 
the influence of the tone of TV news on the evaluation of candidates, see Dobrzynska et al. (2003) or 
Krewel and Partheymüller 2012. A first attempt to link the RCS data gathered in the 2011 Selects project 
with the associated media content analysis can be found in the master thesis of Simon Lanz (2012). 
25 The trendlines are based on 5-day moving averages and show in how many articles per day a specific 
issue has been mentioned during the campaign (no weights applied). For possibilities of a weighting of the 
media data, see Lanz (2012). 
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Figure 16: Selected issues related to the campaign mentioned  
in print and online-media over time 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
The RCS design is an excellent means to study the influence of campaigns and 
dynamics of electoral behaviour in the final period of an election campaign, since it 
proves to be suitable in capturing the fluctuation in voting intentions, the perception of 
candidates and parties, and the salience of campaign issues on a daily basis. Even 
more importantly, the RCS allows the capturing of unexpected campaign events, which 
could not have been foreseen at the beginning of a campaign. RCS studies therefore 
have the potential to fill a still existing gap in the knowledge of electoral behaviour: how 
do campaigns influence the short-term voting behaviour in elections?  
The Selects 2011 RCS was the first of its kind conducted in Switzerland ever. Thus 
there was no previous experience with the design and although experience from other 
countries was well transferable regarding the general design, this was not the case for 
the planning of the fieldwork, as conditions affecting surveys vary greatly from country 
to country. Designing the study and the fieldwork had therefore be based on many 
assumptions, and it wasn’t clear whether these assumptions would actually hold.  
Some difficulties with the fieldwork were thus inevitable. The response rates were lower 
than expected, and we had to adjust the number of addresses to reach our target of 
100 daily interviews. The target was particularly difficult to reach during weekends, and 
respondents showed strong resistance to Sunday interviews. In future studies, more 
effort needs to be put into interviewer training and detailed daily reporting from the 
survey agency. 
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Despite these issues, it was possible to gather high quality data, as shown in our initial 
analyses. Among other things, we could show in this paper that the socio-
demographics do not vary unexpectedly during the entire campaign period and 
response rates are not lower than they are in the post-election survey. We also show 
that the RCS data has great potential to be analysed in different ways. The data can be 
used to show aggregated fluctuation of different variables over a given campaign 
period, either by using smoothing techniques or analytical tools. It can also be used to 
model vote intentions or other dependent variables, such as party evaluations, in 
combination with the media content analysis that was carried out in parallel to the RCS. 
And last but not least, the data can also be used as a conventional panel study, as the 
pre-election RCS survey was combined with a post-election panel wave in which the 
respondents were asked about their actual behaviour. 
Different challenges, however, remain. As expected, the relatively small daily samples 
produced a rather large day-to-day variance that can be attributed to random sampling 
error. This random “noise” has to be separated from real changes due to campaign 
influence. The data can be smoothened or days can be clustered to achieve larger 
sample sizes. For modelling RCS data in a more complex way, multi-level models can 
be applied (for recent contributions in this direction, see e.g. Krewel and Partheymüller 
2012 or Hoffmann 2012). 
However, given the flexibility provided by the RCS data, especially in combination with 
a post-election panel component, the design has the potential to outperform other 
forms of pre-election surveys. Pre-election cross-section studies struggle to capture 
campaign dynamics, whereas panels allow only for a limited number of waves, which 
means that in both cases the effects of important campaign events may be missed out.  
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